Category Archives: China

What’s Old is New Again: Predictions for Southeast Asia 2016

Will there be more skirmishes in the South China Sea in 2016? Photo: Getty Images

Will there be more skirmishes in the South China Sea in 2016? Photo: Getty Images

Much can change in a year’s time. In January 2015, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew was still alive, Aung San Suu Kyi’s future as leader of Myanmar was quite uncertain and East by Southeast was not making any predictions about international affairs in Southeast Asia. But again, much can change in a year’s time.

2016 will be a critical period for geopolitics in the region, as new strategic relationships are formed and existing ones strengthened. Many experts talk of a growing polarization of the region as countries position themselves between the US and China, a trend due in large part to rising tensions in the South China Sea. The conflict will take center stage in 2016. Look for the the Netherlands-based Permanent Court of Arbitration to publish its initial findings on the Philippines’ case against China in the first half of 2016. Despite not ruling on sovereignty issues, the outcome of this case will likely anger China and lead to a more aggressive stance towards the Philippines and other claimants. As the Philippines and Vietnam rely more heavily on the US for security guarantees in the South China Sea, more US flyovers and naval patrols in the contested waters are to be expected. Look for the US Navy to begin to use Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay for “maintenance” purposes and to park its ships on a somewhat permanent basis  in the Philippines’ Subic Bay after joint military exercises finish in April 2016.

Conversely, look for the emerging Sino-Thai regional axis to be solidified in 2016. This relationship, despite not bringing much to the languishing Thai economy, will tighten the ruling junta’s grip on power. Thailand’s long drift towards authoritarianism will add further strains on ties with the US, its long-term external security power. Of course, the permanent white elephant in the room in Thailand is the king’s health. With his majesty in poor health, lese majeste cases will continue to multiply as the junta’s concern grows.  His death and the subsequent succession struggle would likely send the country into chaos, even with the army in control. Such a collapse of the Thai political structure would have major repercussions for the region’s stability.

Laos is also in for a tough year ahead. Its chairing of ASEAN will do more to highlight its shortcomings than celebrate its successes. With the opening of Xayaburi Dam, Don Sahong Dam scheduled to break ground in 2016 and preliminary studies beginning on a third Mekong dam at Pak Beng, there will be renewed calls from the international community for Laos to reconsider its hydropower plans for the Mekong River. The landlocked country’s lack of finesse in dealing with the South China Sea conflict will also draw criticism, all punctuated by continuing questions about the kidnapping of Lao activist Sombath Somphone.

In Cambodia, the political impasse between the ruling Cambodia People’s Party and the Cambodia National Rescue Party will continue through the first half of 2016. Expect strongman Hun Sen to find an 11th hour solution paving the way for opposition leader Sam Rainsy to return from self-imposed exile to begin preparing for the 2017 parliamentary elections.

Barring another major fracture in Thai politics, Vietnam’s National Party Congress will mark the region’s most significant political transition in 2016. Nguyen Tan Dung is likely to be selected as Vietnamese Communist Party chairman, with Truong Tan Sang staying on as president or similar role to balance Dung’s reformist tendencies. Dung’s leadership will be key as Vietnam implements the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a painful process that will force Vietnam to learn to run and walk at the same time. Dung’s princeling son, Nguyen Thanh Nhgi, will also be elevated to the Central Committee and has a bright path ahead if his father can lead the country into a new era of high economic growth and balanced relations between the US, China and Russia.

Corruption scandals will continue to keep a stranglehold on Indonesian and Malaysian politics. In Indonesia, President Joko Widodo’s efforts to prop up a sagging economy will be hampered by an unstable cabinet and nagging questions relating to 2015’s Freeport corruption scandal. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Najib Razak will continue to face intense public scrutiny over the 1MDB scandal. It is possible that Najib will use a new national security law to muffle Malaysian civil society’s calls for his resignation.

After refreshingly open elections in 2015, 2016 will be a year of political posturing for Myanmar. As Aung San Suu Kyi and her victorious National League for Democracy take power in early 2016, the military will position itself to retain many of its past privileges. Look for Than Shwe and the other generals to create a formal post in the government for Aung San Suu Kyi, who is legally barred from the presidency, in a bid to define and contain her power as head of the NLD. Those expecting radical change from the NLD government will be disappointed – there will be little structural political reform, the NLD’s foreign policy will be largely similar to Thein Sein’s, and the ethnic reconciliation process will still muddle along. However, look for the new ruling party to permanently shut down the Myitsone hydropower project and consider suspending the Salween river’s cascade of dams in order to push along the ethnic peace process.

Like 2015, this year will see a further intensification of the Rohingya refugee crisis. However, with the world’s eyes adjusted to seeing the plight of refugees, there will be more attention paid to the issue and Aung San Suu Kyi will receive pressure from both Western and Muslim-majority countries to solve the problem of Rohingya persecution in Myanmar. Another ethnic group that came to the forefront last year, China’s Uighur population will also stay in the news in 2016. Increased crackdowns in their home Xinjiang province will force more refugees into Southeast Asia, and lead to a handful of Uighur-related terrorist attacks, both foiled and executed, in Thailand and Indonesia.

The regional economy will see decreased growth in 2016 as a result of slowing growth and structural issues in the Chinese economy. Chinese money will still flow south as the One Belt One Road strategy is rolled out and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank officially opens for business. Contrary to some expectations, the AIIB’s first loan recipient will not be Myanmar, but either Laos or Cambodia.

On the other side of the coin, the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership will begin the ratification process in a number of regional countries this year. Our bets on order of approval are Singapore first, followed by Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. Indonesia will likely commit to the TPP by the end of the year while Thailand’s economic struggles under the military junta will push it closer to joining. Much of the US-ASEAN Sunnylands conference in February will be centered on TPP ratification, along with South China Sea issues and counter-terrorism cooperation, and will serve to solidify relations between the US and the bloc. ASEAN leaders will be looking for assurances of American commitment to the region during the next administration and they will likely receive them. Of course the future of the TPP and the US Rebalance to Asia lies in the fate of the US Presidential elections and our prediction is that America’s first woman president will keep the Rebalance at the forefront of her foreign policy – after all it was her idea.

Last but not least, the Asian Economic Community will be the same on January 1, 2017 as it was at the head of this year – a half-baked dream with little hope of success.

To all of the East by Southeast readers and their families, we wish a you happy new year and much joy and success in 2016!

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Filed under ASEAN, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Economic development, Foreign policy, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Mekong River, Myanmar/Burma, Philippines, Regional Relations, SLIDER, South China Seas, Thailand, USA, Vietnam

Mekong lessons: Reflecting on October trip to Southeast Asia

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I’ve just returned from my first business trip to Southeast Asia with the Stimson Center’s “Team Mekong.”  Below are a few lessons learned and brief observations from our visits in Bangkok, Kunming, Phnom Penh, Can Tho, Hanoi, and Saigon.

Good ideas gain currency

Before I joined the Stimson team in June, I must confess that my outlook on the future of the Mekong region was not filled with optimism. I cannot begin to describe how refreshing it is to join a team that is developing pragmatic and innovative solutions to some of the region’s toughest issues. Moreover, it’s extremely satisfying to watch the deployment of an idea gain momentum among decision makers and begin to take on a life of its own. Simply put, ideas work. At public forums in Bangkok, Kunming and Hanoi and in meetings with regional government officials Stimson’s “Team Mekong” launched a more refined version of the concept of the need for a “New Narrative” on Mekong hydropower development first mooted by my colleagues, SEA Program Director Rich Cronin and Research Associate Courtney Weatherby this March. The New Narrative challenges the current narrative that the construction of 11 dams on the Mekong’s main stem is a prevailing ‘domino theory’ of inevitability based on an emerging body of evidence. Stimson’s most recent report and its main argument can be found here, but it was encouraging to hear the idea confirmed when well informed hydropower experts placed their bets on no more than five dams, all of them above Vientiane excepting Don Sahong.

So if the Lao PDR government is banking on income generated from the construction of eleven main stem dams but only gets five in the end, shouldn’t it consider alternatives? Considering the known and unknown costs of downstream effects on fisheries and livelihoods, it seems prudent for Laos to give the entire basin development plan another look.  As a sustainable, one-country alternative to relieving the pressure of hydropower development on the Mekong’s main stem along with the unbearable downstream costs related to impacted fisheries and livelihoods, the Stimson team is continuing to develop the concept of a Laos national power grid designed for both the export of hydropower and national electrification as an alternative to Laos’ current economic development plan.

The grid would be designed to optimized trade-offs related to the food- water-energy nexus on a basin wide scale. On this trip, we received much encouragement for the national power grid concept from regional government officials, but challenges still remain in convincing Laos as to why national electrification will provide more benefits than the current plan.  As a suggestion, Vietnam, as a most concerned state in regard to downstream impacts can, share the story of the benefits of rural electrification with its neighbor through the history of its own development.  Further, Vietnam’s electricity demand is increasing at 12% year-on-year prior to the TPP and could act as a major purchaser of power generated from a Laos’s national grid.

No clear trends on the China Factor.

I see no clear evidence that China’s state-owned enterprises are trending toward improving practices in Southeast Asia or that there is a concerted move from policy-motivated concessional projects to those based on financial viability. A few firms might be making improvements here or there, but even these firms are not willing to release the details and data supporting these so-called improvements. In the case of Hydrolancang’s Lower Sesan 2 project in Cambodia, the developer claims its fish passages will be successful in protecting vulnerable fish species, but will not release the research or plans for those fish passages for public observation or scrutiny. The message for Hydrolancang and other similar Chinese dam developers hasn’t changed: “We’ve conducted 100% of research relevant to these projects, and we’re confident that all problems will be solved. You only need to trust us.” But trust is built on results and transparent public relations. China simply runs a poor track record on these factors in the Mekong region.

A surprising development is that China’s firms are playing the victim when discussing their Southeast Asian projects. Officers of these firms claim Beijing put them to task on these projects while the firms have to bear the risks and interact with prickly civil society groups, unwarranted Western criticism, and unstable host governments – the Myitsone dam serves as a case in point. Yet they fail to acknowledge the unbalanced stream of benefits granted by concessional contracts or the processes through which these benefits are gained.

Further, these firms often claim to strictly follow the laws and regulations of host countries related to environmental and social impacts. Yet weak states like Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia have promulgated little to nothing in terms of environmental or social safeguards, so these claims of being responsible legal investors are interpreted as trite and non-persuasive.

Lastly, some anecdotal evidence points to Chinese money earmarked for overseas infrastructure development drying up in this latest round of China’s economic downturn. This discovery supports emerging conversations that Chinese firms are investing in more commercially viable or “bankable” projects. However, at the same time China’s One Belt One Road initiative appears to be creating a pool for free money given out on soft terms to any firm interested in constructing a project vaguely related to the objectives of the One Belt One Road whatever they may be. When weighing whether or not China’s upcoming investment on Mekong main-stem dams in the pipeline will be based on strategic motivations or sound financial decision making, this last point is particularly concerning.

New institutional frameworks are forming to coordinate regional policy making.

It’s becoming increasingly clear that the Mekong River Commission is NOT the institution to solve the big issues rising the Mekong region, though it still constitutes the only treaty-based intergovernmental organization in the region, and its technical review of the Xayaburi dam and its anticipated critique of the Don Sahong project have caused both developers to delay the projects and spend hundreds of millions on significant engineering changes and additional fisheries research. But in terms of actual governmental engagement, other institutions and bilateral arrangements are beginning to fill this gap. The US-led Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), for instance, in its still nascent form aims to promote higher standards on water resource management and assessment of infrastructure development within the region. The LMI brings together the line ministries of the four MRC countries and Myanmar several times a year in working groups both on functional “pillars” and cross-cutting issues like the water-energy-food nexus, and the prime ministers of the LMI countries meet in the wings of the annual ASEAN-US Leaders Meeting, where transboundary issues and impacts from hydropower dams and other major infrastructure projects can be raised to the extent that the leaders are willing to engage on them.

In response to both the US-led LMI and the waning power of the MRC, China is assembling a multi-lateral organization for joint river basin management called the Lancang-Mekong Dialogue Mechanism (LMDM). Mekong watchers should pay attention to the outcomes of the first vice-ministerial meeting of the LMDM on November 12. Further, Cambodia is negotiating a transboundary environmental impact assessment treaty with Laos and Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are authoring new sets of environmental and social safeguards related to infrastructure development.

These frameworks are all coming together quite quickly. Yet even the US led LMI is said to be underfunded, uncoordinated, and unsure of its product. China’s forming of its own river basin organization is a welcomed foray into multi-lateral diplomacy, a realm often eschewed by the Chinese, but the intent and purpose of this organization is unclear. Serious cooperation on the use of the water and hydropower development will be highly limited so long as China refuses on national security grounds to provide downstream countries with the results of its hydrological and water quality studies, or the operation of its dams and other water releases from its monster reservoirs.  And whether or not new safeguards in the Mekong’s weakest countries will have teeth or just pay green-washing lip-service is unknown.  These developments all deserve our close attention.

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Yunnan border zone slated to cost 200 billion yuan

New infrastructure projects, like the Kunming-Singapore Railway, will be passing through southern Yunnan on their way to Southeast Asia.

New infrastructure projects, like the Kunming-Singapore Railway, will be passing through southern Yunnan on their way to Southeast Asia.

Investment and development money continues to pour into southern Yunnan’s Xishuangbanna. Weeks after the largest resort in the province opened near the city of Jinghong, prefectural officials unveiled plans for a new economic zone with an eye-popping price tag.

The Mengla Economic Zone, according to plans approved this summer by the Yunnan Development and Reform Commission, will span 4,500 square kilometers, centered around Mengla County (勐腊县). Initial estimates place the cost of the multi-purpose undertaking at 200 billion yuan (US$31.4 billion). The zone spans 240 as-yet unclear projects reportedly focusing on the sectors of agriculture, education, logistics, processing, tourism and transportation.

The latter of the these is perhaps most important to national planners. Connecting cities in Yunnan to Southeast Asia by rail has long been a goal of the Bridgehead Strategy, which looks to integrate the province’s economy more closely to those of its international neighbors. Mengla County borders Laos and is one key component in plans to build a web of railway lines by 2020 which will further connect Southeast Asia with Kunming.

Progress, however, has been slow on multiple fronts. The Kunming-Singapore Railway — the main trunk line of the planned network — was once expected to open in 2015. However, due to ongoing financial disagreements between China, Laos and Thailand, completion projections have been pushed back at least five years.

In that time, a branch railway along the recently opened Kunming-Hekou line will be extended 500 kilometers south to the border town of Mohan (磨憨) in Mengla County. When finished, the railway will pass from Yuxi through Pu’er, Jinghong and Mohan before linking up with a 44.5 billion yuan (US$7 billion) Chinese-built high-speed line running to Laos’ capital, Vientiane.

The newly announced Mengla Economic Zone appears to be a very expensive kick-starter of sorts. Its launch is not only aimed at furthering Chin’s Bridgehead Strategy, but also seems designed to convince Laos — which is wagering half its annual GDP on the railway project — that Chinese intentions are serious and longstanding.

Regardless of the effects on Laos, the economic zone is another enormous financial shot in the arm for largely rural Xishuangbanna. Less than one month ago, real estate conglomerate Wanda opened a 15 billion yuan (US$2.36 billion) resort and development area of its own in the prefecture. The goal for such a sizable investment, in the words of company chairman Wang Jianlin (王健林), is to “…revolutionize Yunnan’s tourism industry“. One way or another, it looks as if sleepy Xishuangbanna is in for drastic changes in the coming years.

The preceding article was written by Patrick Scally and originally posted on GoKunming. It is republished here, in its entirety, with full permission from the author. 

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Filed under China, Economic development, GMS, Laos, Myanmar/Burma, SLIDER, Trade, Yunnan Province

Report: “Mismanagement” stalling building projects across China

Work continues on the Darui Railroad in western Yunnan Image credit :cr8gc

Work continues on the Darui Railroad in western Yunnan. Image credit: cr8gc

Hundreds of highway and railroad projects are facing delays or otherwise running far behind originally envisioned construction timetables. This, according to a report issued by China’s National Audit Office, is a result of local governments improperly managing infrastructure funds — actions thought to have a direct effect on the country’s stalling economy.

In total, the audit of projects nationwide looked into 815 infrastructure programs across the country. More than 20 percent — 193 in total — were found “to be experiencing significant implementation lags due to a lack of funds or poor initial planning.” Together, the behind-schedule ventures represent government investment of 287 billion yuan (US$45.2 billion).

The architects of China’s economy have traditionally relied heavily on state-funded building projects as a means to revitalize the financial system in times of decline. Therefore, those lagging behind schedule due to mismanagement or misuse are seen as harming the economy in two ways, according to the audit. Not only are funds not being spent as quickly as they are authorized, but the benefits to localities through which new infrastructure projects pass must wait idly for any expected economic uplift.

In Yunnan, this is especially true in the province’s west. A railroad from Dali — traveling through Yongping, Baoshan, Mangshi and terminating at Ruili on the Burmese border — was originally expected to be completed in 2014. It will provide some of the most populated regions in western Yunnan direct rail access to Kunming for the first time ever. However, due to cost over-runs and awkward mountainous terrain, the line is now expected to open as late as 2019.

In an effort to speed up construction along the single-track Darui Railroad (大瑞铁路), Beijing injected a further five billion yuan (US$788 million) in annual funding for the endeavor beginning in 2012. The 335 kilometer railway is 75 percent tunnels and bridges, making for difficult surveys and slow progress, especially in places where engineers must dig under theGaoligong Mountains.

The railway was first conceived of in 1938 as a way to connect Kunming with the British colony of Burma. The outbreak of World War II scuttled those plans. However, they have since been resurrected as one part of the massive BCIM trade corridor, which Beijing hopes will one day provide an overland link between Kunming and seaports on the Indian coast some 2,800 kilometers away.

This post was originally published on GoKunming and written by Patrick Scally. It is reprinted here, in its entirety, with permission from the author. 

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China initiates enormous Yangtze water diversion scheme

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Although not on the scale of the Grand Canal or the Three Gorges Dam, the waterways of Yunnan province are undergoing radical changes. This is especially true in the Three Parallel Rivers Protected Areas. In the name of “development” and “drought prevention”, a new project launched in the province will divert a stunning quantity of water away from the headwaters of the world’s fourth longest river.

Dignitaries and officials attended groundbreaking ceremonies for the Dian Zhong Water Diversion Project (滇中引水工程) on September 30 in Lijiang. Attendees oversaw the initial launch of a program that will divert an estimated 3.403 billion cubic meters of water annually away from the upper reaches of the Yangtze — known as the Jinsha River (金沙江). The ceremony was overseen by Provincial Party Secretary Li Jiheng (李纪恒), while a similar event was held simultaneously in Dali.

The water in question will be funneled southeast through naturally occurring rivers and lakes, first passing near the cities of Dali and Chuxiong before reaching Kunming, Yuxi and Honghe. The intended goals of the project include providing more water for municipal, agricultural and industrial use during times of drought. Of added benefit, according to local media reports, will be the influx of clean water into several lakes suffering from major environmental degradation.

Even though Yunnan as a whole is rich in water resources, the middle of the province is periodically crippled by drought. It is hoped by officials the Dian Zhong Water Diversion Project may avert future water shortages such as the five-year dry-spell between 2009 and 2014 that threatened millions of people and led to billions in lost revenue.

Lakes affected include Kunming’s Dianchi (滇池),Qilu (杞麓湖) near the city of Yuxi, and Yilong (异龙湖) in Honghe Prefecture. Dianchi in particular is an environmental nightmare, and for more than a decade has been covered in a thick, green film of algae rendering it’s waters useless even for industrial use.

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The provincial government has repeatedly thrown large sums of money at various Dianchi clean-up and “rehabilitation” efforts. Over the years such measures have included the introduction of invasive plant species, efforts to oxygenate the lake, and theconstruction of water treatment plants along tributary rivers and streams. Nothing has yet showed substantial success.

Two years ago, then-Provincial Party Secretary Qin Guangrong (秦光荣) outlined a new plan for Dianchi, one that would effectively “flush the lake clean” of pollutants and algae with water from the province’s northwest. The Dian Zhong Water Diversion Project appears to be based largely on Qin’s vision, although with a heavily modified and enlarged scope.

The project begins in Shigu (石鼓) — known in China as ‘the first bend in the Yangtze’. From there, an amount of water equivalent to 1,360,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools will be diverted away from the Jinsha River through man-made canals and underground pipelines connected to existing waterways, including the lakes mentioned previously.

Work on the 661-kilometer endeavor — which will not include the construction of any new dams — is expected to take eight years, with “long-term goals” realized by 2040. No cost estimates have yet been made public. Speaking at the ground-breaking ceremony held last month, Yunnan’s acting governor Chen Hao (陈豪), said “This is an exciting time, a time of dreams.”

This article written by Patrick Scally was first posted here on the GoKunming.com website.

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Filed under Agriculture, China, Environment and sustainability, Sustainability and Resource Management, water, Yunnan Province

WanDa opens 15 billion yuan resort in Xishuangbanna

Mockup of Wanda's theme park in Xishuangbanna. PS it never looks like this...

Mockup of Wanda’s theme park in Xishuangbanna.

China’s richest man is looking to expand his gargantuan real estate empire by diversifying into the tourism industry. The first major step in this direction was taken during Mid-Autumn Festival, when Wang Jianlin (王健林), Chairman of Wanda Group, oversaw the opening of a multipurpose resort development in Yunnan’s Xishuangbanna (西双版纳).

Construction on the Wanda International Resort Xishuangbanna began three years ago. Eventually it grew to cover more than five square kilometers of river valley just northwest of the city of Jinghong (景洪). Built at a total cost of 15 billion yuan (US$2.36 billion), the complex features several artificial lakes, an amusement and water park, IMAX theaters, Dai minority themed luxury villas, a Wanda shopping center, three resort hotels, a hospital and several schools.

Speaking at the opening ceremony, Wang revealed his company will invest 95 billion yuan for further tourism and business development in the province over the next four years. Quoted by the South China Morning Post, Wang said with such a large outlay of funds, his company plans to “…revolutionize Yunnan’s tourism industry”.

The success of that revolution will definitely be aided by the money Wanda has already invested, but other factors loom large. Chief among these is a spur line on the oft-delayed Kunming-Singapore Railway. When and if is is built — some forecasts predict an opening date of 2018 — the high-speed railroad would connect Yunnan’s capital to Jinghong in just over two hours. The city currently has no direct rail link to Kunming.

Currently, Xishuangbanna Prefecture receives an estimated 13 million travelers yearly. That number is expected to rise significantly over the next five years as under-construction and proposed infrastructure projects are completed. For its part, Wanda is banking on a surge in both tourism and investment, offering newly built villas and condominiums located inside the Wanda International Resort Xishuangbanna for between 4,500 and 6,000 yuan a square meter.

The development conglomerate is not only focusing on Yunnan and what is commonly called its “untapped tourism resources”. This year alone, Wanda has signed other travel development contracts in Guangxi, Guizhou, Henan, Liaoning and Sichuan provinces worth 680 billion yuan (US$107 billion). Completing the circle connecting tourism and real estate, Chairman Wang has also hinted his company will soon delve into China’s cutthroat airline industry.

This article written by Patrick Scally was first published here in on the GoKunmin.com site. 

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Solving Southeast Asia’s drug problem

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Image of the Golden Triangle where Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar meet.

The Obama administration has once again named Myanmar and Laos to its list of twenty-two countries determined to be major drug trafficking countries or major drug transit countries. The White House memo, issued on Monday, noted that Myanmar “failed demonstrably during the last twelve months to make sufficient or meaningful efforts to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements.” The United States, however, did extend Myanmar a National Interest Waiver to promote democracy and avoid reduction of aid to Burma as a result of the designation.

The Golden Triangle, an area formed roughly by the upland frontier areas of Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, and China, was the world’s leading opium producer from the 1960s to the 1980s. But just less than ten years ago, it was moving toward opium free status as deepening economic ties with a rising China brought new investment and governments supported crop substitution programs in the region. Now, opium, methamphetamines, and other drugs from the Golden Triangle are once again flooding regional and global markets.

In just the past two months alone, 26mn methamphetamine tablets were seized in Yangon, Myanmar and 1.5 tons of marijuana packed into coffee shipments from Laos were seized in Cambodia. Earlier this year The New York Times ran a series of exposes on opium production and heroin addiction in Myanmar’s conflict-ridden Shan and Kachin states. The United Nations estimates that Myanmar’s poppy cultivation has tripled since 2006 and takes up almost 150,000 acres.

Despite recent spurts of economic growth in Myanmar and Laos, flagging economic conditions on the countries’ peripheries and civil war in Myanmar are pushing marginal peoples toward the production of opium. Lucrative cash crops like opium won’t make farmers rich, but hired labor on an illegal opium farm in Kachin state will earn $8 per hour compared with $2.50 working on a legal farm.

A new push factor for upland drug production in Laos and Myanmar is the arrival of small-scale agricultural investors from China’s neighboring Yunnan province. Their projects, often set up on lowland concessions granted by national or local governments, utilize less local labor and thus create a landless poor classes that literally ‘head for the hills’ to cultivate opium. Another new addition to the landscape is recently built highways and other infrastructure development projects that link urban centers but often ignore the periphery. Poor road conditions in upland areas cannot facilitate logistical support or encourage investment that could promote legal and productive agricultural activities in upland areas. And once the opium makes its way down narrow trails to the lowland areas, the highway serve as quick conduits for global distribution networks.

Being out of reach from state security and legal institutions – which typically underperform at any rate in Laos and Myanmar – permits opium farmers and trafficking middlemen to operate with impunity. Upland Southeast Asia is not the only place affected. Evidence shows drug use is on the rise in China and within Southeast Asia’s growing urban and rural middle classes. Moreover, crackdown efforts in lowland areas of these countries has only pushed production further into upland areas which are harder to reach.

Efforts to control and stem opiate production in Laos and Myanmar are often focused on identification and eradication. Government agencies locate productive areas and destroy illegal crops. This often forces rural peoples into poverty or drives villagers to new, more remote areas ripe for opium production. The UN and China have introduced crop substitution as a solution in Myanmar and Laos. But this “big state solution” often fails in its implementation because it neglects the needs of upland agriculture and flounders in its long term commitment to solving the problem.

In 2007, China’s crop substitution programs looked to be succeeding in reducing opium production. However, poor investment in infrastructure and low commitment to technical assistance created a situation where alternative cash crops could not compete on a global market and upland farmers were left high and dry.

Investments in coffee and rubber – often seen as more lucrative cash crops – take three to seven years to yield a harvest. This, coupled with falling global food prices and high transportation costs due to lack of infrastructure, discourages alternative investment. As a result, crop substitution investments in sugar, buckwheat, coffee, and rubber have consistently failed or are currently flagging in upland Southeast Asia.

To effectively curb the production of opium and other illegal drugs in upland areas of Myanmar and Laos, expenditure on agricultural extension programs and infrastructure such as paved roads and logistical facilities must increase to attract suitable investment into these areas. Advances in the peace process in Myanmar and resultant spurts of legitimate economic growth in the country’s ethnic autonomous states will do much to curb opium and methamphetamine production. Laos, however, is a different story. Even peace cannot stem opiate production, with its current set of weak institutions dictated by the fiat of a few powerful families with strong ties to China. Counter-narcotic efforts are vital to stop the flow of opium and methamphetamines in Southeast Asia. But they must be paired with viable economic solutions for the upland farmers involved in drug production.

This article was first published here on The Diplomat website on September 17. 

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Filed under China, Current Events, Economic development, GMS, Governance, Laos, Myanmar/Burma, SLIDER, Thailand

Why Beijing isn’t using the Erawan Shrine bombing to its advantage

A statue of Brahma at the Erawan shrine in Bangkok. The Hindu shrine is popular with people of Chinese descent, including Thais.

An image of Brahma at the Erawan shrine in Bangkok. The Hindu shrine is popular with Chinese tourists, who were among the victims of the attack.

A connection between Uyghur militants from China’s northwest and the August 17th bombing of Bangkok’s Erawan Shrine has been confirmed. Thailand’s police chief made the link explicit during a news conference Tuesday. While the geopolitical consequences of the connection remain to be seen, Beijing could still stand to benefit from the Erawan bombing. However, fears over domestic implications may keep China from using the attack to their advantage.

Two men who have been taken into custody in connection with the case are Yusufu Mieraili and Adem Karadag. Mieraili was arrested in late August with a Chinese passport that listed his birthplace as Xinjiang province – the homeland for the oppressed Muslim-Turkic Uyghur minority. The second suspect was found in an apartment outside Bangkok along with bomb-making materials and dozens of fake Turkish passports.

Thai police issued an arrest warrant for another suspect from Xinjiang, Abudusataer Abudureheman, on Saturday. The 27 year-old Chinese national goes by the name ‘Ishan’ and is the suspected mastermind of the operation. The wanted poster for Ishan first reported that he was of Uyghur ethnicity, though a second version removed the reference and Thai authorities subsequently asked media to “drop the word”.

Observers, both international and Thai made early connections  between the Erawan bombing and the forced repatriation of 109 Chinese Uyghur refugees in July, though it is only now that Thai authorities have acknowledged the Uyghur links to the case. On Tuesday, Thai’s chief of police, Gen. Somyot Poompanmoung blamed the attack on human traffickers who aided Uyghurs refugees, angry that their network had been disrupted by Thai authorities. “Put simply, we destroyed their business.”

Combating domestic terrorism

While the connection between the controversial deportation and the bombing is seemingly bad news for China, there are a number of ways in which the PRC could benefit from this situation. First, the bombing legitimizes China’s domestic anti-terrorism efforts.

The Uyghur struggle for autonomy and Beijing’s efforts to contain it has been anything but peaceful. Systematic state-sponsored economic and physical violence in Xinjiang has been met with repeated attacks on police stations, government buildings, markets and train stations, both in Xinjiang and elsewhere. Beijing has long claimed that many of the terror attacks were coordinated by the East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM), a shadowy separatist organization allegedly linked to al-Qaeda. The very existence of ETIM, let alone its potency, has long been debated among experts and China has struggled to receive widespread recognition for its fight against domestic terrorism. This is largely due to doubts over ETIM and opposition to China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang.

The Erawan attack could change this. Now Beijing can point to the Erawan bombing as credible evidence that Uyghur terrorism is a threat that deserves attention outside of China. By internationalizing the issue, the Chinese government can rationalize its repeated crackdowns on Uyghurs to an international community which has been critical of its past policies. Now, Uyghur terrorism is an international issue that affects everyone – Bangkok was the world’s most visited city in 2014, after all.

Cross-border cooperation

Additionally, with an internationalization of Uyghur terrorism comes more opportunities for cross-border cooperation. Sino-Thai relations, already made closer by new trans-boundary infrastructure projects, will undoubtedly be strengthened by the Erawan attack. In February 2015, a counter-terrorism cooperation pact was signed between Indonesia and China following the repatriation of four Uyghurs accused of planning the Kunming train station attack. A similar agreement is a likely consequence of the Erawan attack.

International cooperation in combating (and sometimes creating) terror networks has been a lowest-common denominator of sorts for inter-state relations in the 21st century and China should take advantage of this. In the past, China has used links between Uyghur militants and terror cells in northwest Pakistan to strengthen relations with the South Asian state. In light of the Erawan blast, Beijing could coordinate its counter-terrorism efforts with Washington. Sino-US relations have noticeably worsened in recent years, and counter-terrorism, aside from global warming, may be the safest area for increased cooperation between the two regional rivals.

Coordination of border control efforts in Southeast Asia, particularly along China’s southern boundary is another area of possible cooperation. Uyghur migration through southwest China into Southeast Asia is a relatively new trend, and the number of migrants has swelled in recent years. Refugees have been known to use existing smuggling routes out of China and through Southeast Asia, exploiting porous borders and corrupt guards on the way. With the specter of international terrorism looming, China and its southern neighbors could increase cooperation along the margins. This would particularly benefit China’s ties with Myanmar and Vietnam, two countries with strained relations to Beijing.

Historically, Southeast Asian governments have acquiesced to China’s demands for detained Uyghur refugees to be repatriated and many observers presumed that the trend would continue along with China’s rise in regional influence. However, there is wide speculation that the attack at the Erawan Shrine, a site popular with ethnic Chinese, both Thai and tourist alike, was executed in retaliation for Thailand’s deportation of Uyghur refugees. The repatriation of 109 Uyghurs from Thailand in July led to condemnation from human rights groups and protests at China’s consulate in Istanbul, where nationalist Turks see Uyghurs as their pan-Turkic brethren. After Erawan and Turkey’s summer protests, Southeast Asian governments will likely reconsider any future deportations for fear of similar retribution.

Internal Worries

Internal worries over the consequences and implications of the Erawan blast may explain Beijing’s continued silence over the incident. While news of the attack did feature prominently in Chinese media in the days following the blast, there has been scarce coverage of the subsequent investigation, let alone the identity of the alleged attackers. Moreover, Beijing has actively denied Uyghur links to the Erawan attack, calling such speculation “hugely irresponsible” in the days following the explosion. Following the Tuesday statement from Gen. Somyot, there has been no mention of the Uyghur link to Erawan in the Chinese press.

China’s fears are not without merit. First, that the attackers hail from Xinjiang could be a point of embarrassment for the Chinese government. The crisis in northwest China has grown worse by the year – 2014 saw the expansion of Uyghur violence out of Xinjiang to the rest of China – and 2015 has now brought an international attack linked to the Uyghur separatist movement.

In the past, Beijing has refrained from mentioning the ethnicity of suspects in domestic attacks for fear of stoking ethnic tensions. Similar concerns are likely influencing China’s actions post-Erawan. Implicit in China focusing at all on the attack’s connection to Xinjiang is an acknowledgement of failure in solving the country’s ethnic problems and an admission of partial culpability. The government is already having enough trouble convincing its citizenry that it is capable of guiding the country through an economic slowdown – adding more doubts over ethnic and security issues is the last thing Beijing wants.

A Coordinated Response?

The lack of coverage of the investigation in China has been mirrored by Thai authorities’ previous reluctance to link the explosion to Uyghur separatism, and its continued avoidance labeling the attack as terrorism. This, like China’s strategy, is likely targeted at the Chinese public. The number of Chinese visitors to Thailand has exploded in recent years and the money they bring has been a welcome addition to the country’s economy as other sectors have faltered since a military junta took power in 2014. News of a bomb in downtown Bangkok was always going to affect tourism numbers, but connections to Uyghur terrorism will undoubtedly cause many prospective Chinese visitors to think twice before booking flights to the kingdom.

What’s more, Thailand’s handling of the case has raised questions of Chinese involvement in the case. The delayed official announcement of the Uyghur and the offiical waffling over the ethnicity of the suspects signaled to some that China had an affect on the investigation. Further, Thai officials asked media to avoid analysis that might affect “international relationships,” interpreted by many to mean China. A coordinated response by Bangkok and Beijing would make sense. In addition to being the source of millions of tourists each year,  China is Thailand’s largest trade partner and the closest ally of its military government.

Now that Bangkok has shown its hand, Beijing’s response will be critical to watch. Political savvy on the part of China’s foreign ministry could turn an international tragedy into an opportunity for more positive ties with Southeast Asia. However, the domestic implications of publicizing the link between Xinjiang and Erawan shrine will likely keep Beijing silent for now.

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Filed under China, Current Events, Human trafficking, Kunming Train Station Attack, Regional Relations, SLIDER, Thailand

Remembering Yunnan’s Role in World War Two

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The streets of Beijing are abuzz with patriotism, filled with goose-stepping soldiers, gleaming new military hardware and bedecked with five-star red flags. It is the seventieth anniversary of Japan’s formal surrender in 1945, an act that brought the cataclysm of the Second World War to its official end.

While the capital celebrates and hundreds of millions watch the Beijing parade on television, Yunnan residents quietly reflect on their province’s stand in what is officially called the ‘Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression’. Although no parades will be held this year in Kunming commemorating those who fought and died, Yunnan’s stature as one of China’s last bastions of hope remains undiminished, if often a bit misunderstood.

The vicissitudes of history — especially in a war fought on as many fronts as World War Two — leave thousands, if not millions, of stories untold. In Yunnan, the general narrative has by now been boiled down to three major fronts, all of which effected one another. They include the development of Kunming as China’s last ditch air base, a months-long engagement in the mountains of western Yunnan and the opening of the Stilwell Road. Although those three events do not comprise the entirety of the war effort carried out South of the Clouds, they go a long way toward creating a general overview.

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The China National Aviation Corporation, The Flying Tigers and The Hump

Few know that the foundation of the province’s current airport network was laid more than 70 years ago by Americans and Chinese working for an often-misunderstood Chinese/American-owned commercial airline known as China National Aviation Corporation, or CNAC. Founded in 1929 by aircraft manufacturer Curtiss-Wright, CNAC ran into difficulties dealing with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government and was sold to Pan American Airways in 1933.

CNAC fared better in China under Pan Am management and began to service routes linking the United States, Pan American’s Pacific network, and China’s major urban centers, first flying into Kunming in 1935. Runways were hard to come by in China at the time, and CNAC had a competitive advantage with its river planes, which often made water landings on the Yangtze and other waterways.

War was to quickly alter the fate of CNAC. By the end of 1941, CNAC was making evacuation flights as well as carrying out the dangerous supply runs between India and Kunming for which it would late become famous. When the American Volunteer Group — now more commonly referred to as The Flying Tigers (飞虎队) and credited with bringing down as many as 300 Japanese aircraft during its brief tenure — disbanded in July of 1942, many of its pilots joined CNAC rather than return to the US military. This blurred the lines between CNAC and the Flying Tigers, as the ‘original’ Tigers were now seen in CNAC civilian uniforms.

As Japanese forces gained ground in southern China and Burma, Yunnan and Kunming became a critical nexus for material shipments and air support sorties. Kunming remained un-captured throughout the war, not only due to CNAC and The Flying Tigers, but also because thousands of local civilians turned out to build and repair airstrips, work as makeshift mechanics and otherwise support Allied troops.

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The Huitong Bridge and Ledo Road

During World War II the western part of Yunnan was occupied by Japanese forces. They had effectively cut off the Burma Road that once supplied Yunnan and Sichuan, while simultaneously attempting to stop cargo planes flying The Hump transport route. The planned goal was to march on Kunming and then Chongqing.

The Japanese army could only be stopped from further penetration by blowing up the Burma Road bridge at Huitong (惠通桥), where it crossed the Nu River — then known to the world outside China by its Burmese name, the Salween. General Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, Allied commander of the China-Burma-India Theater, worked hard to reopen the Burma Road because he saw it as the only way of getting in enough supplies and heavy equipment to fight the war further east into China.

Under his command, American engineering battalions began to cut a road through the north of Burma from the Indian railhead town of Ledo, planning eventually to link up with the original Burma Road at the Chinese border. To recapture the ground through which the supply line needed to travel, Stilwell launched the Salween Campaign. He used the Chinese Expeditionary Army, first established and trained in India, as a vanguard.

This force was made up of Chinese army units cut off from the mainland by Japanese attacks on the Burma Road, as well as other reinforcements flown in on empty Hump return flights to India. These men were known as the X-Force, while the American-trained and supplied Y-Force operated from Yunnan.

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The Y-Force, with the assistance of American supplies, technicians and tactical advisers, forded the Nu River beginning on May 11, 1944. On the first day some 40,000 troops crossed the river with the help of 398 American rubber boats and countless bamboo rafts. In the days that followed, 60,000 more troops and thousands of pack animals carrying supplies crossed the river. The Japanese had not expected an army of this size capable of crossing the rain-swollen river, and were taken by surprise. However, they were able to hold up the enormous force because they retained control of the passes along the Gaoligong Mountains.

The Japanese base at Songshan controlled the Huitong Bridge across the Nu River. The stronghold — referred to as “Gibraltar on the Burma Road” — proved extremely difficult to capture. First, the Chinese tried to storm it en masse but were forced back again and again, each time with heavy losses. Next, the Chinese started to construct trenches up the mountain, but in the end this did not work either. Finally they undermined Japanese command and supply bunkers by digging long tunnels though the mountain. Using tons of US-supplied TNT, the force blew up the mountaintop on August 20, 1944.

Even then there was stiff resistance and the mountain stronghold was only captured on September 7, following more than three months of heavy fighting. The victory was secured at a cost of 7,600 Chinese lives and those of some 3,000 Japanese defenders.

On January 12, 1945 the first convoy left India and followed the recently captured and repaired road. It arrived on February 4 in Kunming, over a twisting thoroughfare by then named the Stilwell Road. The vital supply line combined the original Burma Road — its 900-kilometer Chinese section built by an estimated 200,000 civilians in only eight months — and the US$150 million American-constructed Ledo Road.

The Yunnan front was an incredibly crucial one, for the Allies in general, and China specifically. The once sleepy and forgotten province awoke to the misery and destruction of war and responded more than admirably. Following the war, Yunnan and its people attempted to return to a normality that included a new found pride of place that remains with many to the present day.

This article, written by Patrick Scally, was originally posted here on the GoKunming website on September 3.

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Large dams are not the answer to climate change in the Mekong Region

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Some may say it is too early to conclude that the changing weather patterns in the Mekong region – be it a longer dry season, unexpected river water level fluctuation, or cold days in early summer – are a result of climate change. Even if we could summarize the large number of expert debates and long list of research papers, it’s unlikely that a clear answer to the simple question “Is climate change happening in the Mekong?” would emerge.

But if instead we look on the ground, local communities along the Mekong River in Thailand will tell you that something is happening to the climate and that it’s not what it used to be.

A study1 just published by local Thai communities who live along the Mekong River, titled “Ecology, Economics, Cultures of the Mekong Basin: From Kaeng Kood Koo to Pha Chan in a Changing Current” reports that weather patterns have been fluctuating oddly over the past several years. In addition, the water level in the Mekong River rises and ebbs unpredictably and unlike the past. These changes have greatly affected these communities who still rely on nature to make their living as fishers and farmers (see also video here).

Cold spells and heavy rains: The case of 2011

As an example, we can look back to 2011 when two incidents occurred that appeared odd to many Thai river-side communities and are still recalled now: a highly abnormal cold spell in March 2011 when Thailand is usually warming up ready for the hot season, and then a prolonged period of heavy rainfall that lasted much of 9 months in 2011.

In the Mekong Region, the hottest2 time of the year usually falls in April. It is the same month when Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos celebrate the water festival, which practically speaking is a great way to cool off as the temperature becomes sweltering hot. But back in 2011, a month before this large festive event, the average temperature in Thailand cut to almost half its normal rate to 18 degrees Celsius (°C)3 in Bangkok. In Ubon Ratchatani Province in northeastern Thailand next to the Mekong River, the temperature dropped to around 15 °C.

Basic CMYK

Meanwhile, as the average temperature seemed to struggle to go beyond 25 °C for the whole month of March, the monsoon brought in at least 4 large storms swelling the Mekong River.

To the communities living alongside the river, the most apparent effect of the chill and increased water volume was on the fishery. Local fisher folks hold an intimateknowledge5 of the Mekong fisheries that is passed on from generation to generation. They understand the seasonality of the Mekong River, including how the river’s ecosystems relate to the different types of fish migration, breeding habits, and behaviors. The fishers’ observed that the change in weather pattern and water level in March 2011caused many fish to become dull6 to find food and instead the fish started hiding behind rocks and in pools. As there were less fish swimming in the river, it affected the fish catch of fishers, such that many fishers gave up fishing during the period as it was uneconomical to spend money on diesel fuel when they knew they could find no fish.

The heavy rainfall that started in March continued on for another nine months. In July 2011, Tropical Storm Nock-ten made land fall, bringing severe flooding to North, Northeastern and central Thailand. Large swathes of farmland, as well as Thailand’s capital city Bangkok, were left under water.

2011’s rainy season added so much water to the Mekong River and made the current so unusually turbulent that many riverbanks and riverbank gardens were flooded or even washed away. Many riverbank farmers lost their crops and therefore their income. Assistance and financial help from the local authorities made their way to some communities, but many admitted that they still had to pay for another round of seeds and sprouts by themselves7 hoping that the river water would not flood their land a second time.

Fish and agriculture are the most basic foundation of the livelihoods and economy of the Thai communities along the Mekong River. Fish are a key source of protein. Riverbank gardens are the people’s homemade salad bar. They are both a steady source of income for many communities. The changing weather and its impact on the Mekong River have impacted both.

A Thai fisher with a fish caught from the Mekong River in Baan Muang, Nongkhai Province, February 2013. (Photo by TERRA.)

A Thai fisher with a fish caught from the Mekong River in Baan Muang, Nongkhai Province, February 2013. (Photo by TERRA.)

Climate change as experts (and greenhouse gas emitters) see it

According to studies done by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and theMekong River Commission (MRC), climate change will affect and change the Mekong River in the coming years. And there’s no guarantee that locals are ready to face those challenges. IPCC8 and MRC‘s data point out three things that would result from climate change:

1. Increasing temperature across the basin: One consequence of this is that there will be accelerated glacial melt in the Mekong headwaters, which in the long term will reduce the dry season water released from the glaciers
2. More rain in the rainy season; less rain in the dry season: this will greatly affect both agriculture and fisheries across the basin
3. Longer summers and shorter winters: this could lead to warmer water temperatures and could change fish behaviors, especially related to breeding and migration

To alleviate the impacts of climate change, many governments who ratified the Kyoto Protocol – created under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) treaty to reduce greenhouse gases emissions – came up with an idea to create mechanisms to meet their carbon emission reduction goals. One of the mechanisms is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)9 which provides a long list of projects like renewable energy, methane capture, and reforestation as options to seek carbon credits. Though it sounds like a good mechanism, CDM was never designed to pressure emitters to reduce emissions, but simply to help emitters to “trade-off” carbon emission.

Hydropower development is included in the list of CDM projects. Water is supposed to be a great source of renewable energy to generate electricity as it was at first assumed that dams don’t emit carbon. Yet, recent research10 has revealed this idea to be profoundly wrong and in fact large hydropower dams can have significant carbon footprints.

In 2002, Singapore researchers reminded scientists that greenhouse gas emissions from hydropower reservoirs are under-estimated11. Another report12 published in Nature Climate Change points out that hydropower is not as low-carbon as assumed; instead dams produce emissions as they trap sediments and vegetation in the reservoir, which then decay and release methane and carbon dioxide. An academic study by Marco Aurelio dos Santos13 and his team in 2006 indicated that greenhouse gas emissions from hydropower per megawatt could in some cases be as high as fossil-fueled plants, especially in tropical areas. In a letter in Nature Geoscience in 2011, a group of researchers14 called for significant consideration to be given to hydropower dams’ carbon footprint.

But it is not only a dam’s “carbon footprint” that should be of concern. The process of dam construction can wipe out carbon sinks by triggering deforestation within and beyond reservoir areas, as has happened at the Lower Sesan 2 dam15 site in northeast Cambodia. Dams also block sediments and nutrients from making their way downstream to replenish soils, as well as to rebuild the delta areas and avoid excessive river bank erosion. With less nutrients feeding the soil, farmers may opt for chemical fertilizers to replace the missing nutrients, but in the long term this destroys the soil health and creates a cycle of agrochemical dependency – as well as potentially farmer debt.

Climate justice not climate change

Treaties like the Kyoto Protocol should be designed to pressure high emitters of greenhouse gases to reduce their greenhouse gas contribution that lead to detrimental impacts on the earth and on communities, many of whom are being left in an increasingly vulnerable situation. But at the moment it appears designed to find a means to help these emitters’ behavior appear acceptable before the global community by skewing the climate change debate towards carbon credits instead of true reductions.

The Mekong River basin is home to over 65 million people. The ecological diversity16within the basin sustains the region’s food security17. The Mekong River is second to none when it comes to the amount and diversity18 of fish species which provide both food and income sources in Southeast Asia. But climate change is affecting many people now and it is not stopping. If high emitters of greenhouse gases are serious about addressing climate change, it is time that they started learning about climate justice. They need to learn about the myriad impacts of dams on people19 and the environment, which are already well known to millions of dam affected people globally.

Flooding of a riverbank garden in Phra Klang Toong village, Nakhon Phanom Province, Thailand in December 2013. (Photo by TERRA.)

Flooding of a riverbank garden in Phra Klang Toong village, Nakhon Phanom Province, Thailand in December 2013. (Photo by TERRA.)

The lower Mekong River is already feeling the impact of a series of dams built upstream in China. Thai riparian communities faced another flooding20 in the dry season that spanned between the end of 2013 and early 2014 when the Mekong River unprecedentedly and unexpectedly rose between one and two meters, which lasted for approximately a week before receding. Affected riverside communities lost21 their boats, crops, fish stocks and income as a result of the rapid rise in river level. There was no warning and no government officials reacted to the situation promptly. Locals were left to cope with the situation by their own means. Though no government came forward to confirm if the exceptional water rise and quick ebb were caused by China’s dams, local communities22 stood firm to point to upstream dams for the loss and damages.

With the waning of fossil fuels like coal that are also gaining a bad reputation for releasing large amounts of carbon and creating pollution, some developers and governments are proposing a turn towards hydropower projects and apparently with the support of the CDM. Yet such an approach will never tackle the problem at its root as the current development model champions industrialization and urbanization and still prioritizes high GDP pursued through the use of dirty and unsustainable electricity sources. Large dams are false solutions23 to climate change as they fragment free-flowing rivers and devastate24 local natural resources and communities. Instead a more radical rethinking of development is required, including how we relate to our rivers and the wider ecosystems that could sustain us for the present and future generations.

 This article was originally printed here on the Mekong Commons site.  It is reprinted with permission of the author.
Footnotes
  1. Chantawong et al. (2015) Ecology, Economics, Cultures of the Mekong Basin: From Kaeng Kood Koo to Pha Chan in a Changing Current. Published by Foundation for Ecological Recovery (Thai language).
  2. The Nation (2011) “More cold weather coming“. 29 March 2011.
  3. James Hookway and Wilawan Watcharasakwet. The Wall Street Journal. 19 March 2011. Thailand Braces for Tsunami, Then Cold Snap.
  4. Chantawong et al. (2015) Ecology, Economics, Cultures of the Mekong Basin: From Kaeng Kood Koo to Pha Chan in a Changing Current. p 184 Published by Foundation for Ecological Recovery (Thai language).
  5. A River, Its Fish and Its People: Local Knowledge of the Natural Environment at the Mouth of the Mun River. Mekong Watch. May 2004.
  6. Chantawong et al. (2015) Ecology, Economics, Cultures of the Mekong Basin: From Kaeng Kood Koo to Pha Chan in a Changing Current. Published by Foundation for Ecological Recovery (Thai language).
  7. Chantawong, Montree. “The Shifting Mekong and Damages to Downstream: Who’s Responsible?“. 19 March 2014.
  8.  IPCC (2000). IPCC Special Report – Emission Scenarios. Summary for Policymakers. A Special Report of IPCC Working Group III Published for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
  9. Mira Käkönen. CDM and challenges in delivering to the poor: case study from Cambodia. Finland Futures Research Centre, University of Turku. 28 February 2012.
  10. Roberts, Kale. Mother Earth News (2015). “Renewable Energy Is Not Always ‘Green’: Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Hydroelectric Reservoirs“. 2 July 2015.
  11. Li, Siyue and Lu, X. X. (2012). Uncertainties of Carbon Emission from Hydroelectric Reservoirs. Nat Hazards. 24 March 2012.
  12. Butler, Rhett. Mongabay (2012). “Tropical Dams Are A False Solution to Climate Change“. 27 May 2012.
  13. dos Santos, Marco Aurelio. et al. Gross Greenhouse Gas Fluxes from Hydro-power Reservoir compared to Thermo-power Plants. Energy Policy. (2006)
  14. Barros, Nathan. et al. Carbon Emission From Hydroelectric Reservoirs Linked to Reservoir Age and Latitude. Nature Geoscience. (2011).
  15. Titthara, May. Phnom Penh Post. “Call for Sesan 2 Logging Halt“. 1 July 2015.
  16. The Guardian. “Thorny frog and dementor wasp among new species discovered in Mekong“. 27 May 2015.
  17. International Rivers (2015). “The Mekong Feeds Millions: Dams Threaten Southeast Asia’s Vital Lifeline“.
  18. VietnamNet Bridge. “Hydropower plants likely to affect Mekong River’s fishery resources: experts“. 27 December 2014.
  19. Zaffos, Joshua. “Life on Mekong Faces Threats As Major Dams Begin to Rise“. 20 February 2014.
  20. International Rivers (2014). “Mekong Floods: The Dampening of the Wintery Suffering“. 8 January 2014.
  21. Chantawong, Montree. “The Shifting Mekong and Damages to Downstream: Who’s Responsible?”. 19 March 2014.
  22. Clark, Pilita. Financial Times. “Troubled Waters: the Mekong River Crisis“. 18 July 2014.
  23. TERRA (2013). “The False Solutions to Climate Change: A Case Study on Hydropower in the Mekong River Basin“.
  24. Cronin, Richard P. World Politics Review (2015). “International Pressure Could Still Turn the Tide on Mekong Dams“. 25 March 2015.

 

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